A WOMAN'S CRY FOR HELP: WHY THE UNITED
STATES SHOULD APPLY GERMANY'S MODEL OF
SELF-DEFENSE FOR THE BATTERED WOMAN
DanielleR. Dubin*
I.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................. 235
BATTERED WOMEN IN AMERICA ........................................ 236
III. MURDER DEFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES .......................... 239
IV . IMM INENCY ..................................................................
241
V.
REASONABLENESS .......................................................... 243
VI. DUTY TO RETREAT ......................................................... 244
V II. PROVOCATION ............................................................... 248
II.

V III. N ECESSITY ...................................................................

IX.

249

REQUIREMENTS OF THE BROADER CHOICE OF

EVILS D EFENSE .............................................................
X.

250

APPLICATION OF NECESSITY TO BATTERED

WOMAN SYNDROME .......................................................

252

XI.

THE SYNDROME ............................................................

252

XII.

BWS: LEGAL RECOGNITION OR PSYCHOLOGICAL
.. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . .. . . .. .

253
XIII. GERMAN LAW ............................................................... 257
XIV. THE NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ATTACK ............................... 260
XV. PREEMPTIVE ACTION ...................................................... 262
V ICTIM IZATION? .....................

XVI. GERMANY'S INTERPRETATION OF IMMINENCY:
IDEAL FOR THE BATTERED WOMAN ....................................

264

XVII.CONCLUSION ................................................................

265

I.

INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence cuts across all social, economical, and political
strata. In the United States a woman is beaten every fifteen seconds in her
own home.' In 1988, 1075 women were murdered by their spouses. 2
*
B.S., cu laude, 1991, Florida State University; candidate for Juris Doctor, 1996,
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
1.

CONSTANCE A. BEAN, WOMEN MURDERED BY THE MEN THEY LOVED 38 (1992).

2.

Id. at38.
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Domestic violence accounts for more emergency room visits by women
than muggings, car accidents, and rapes combined., Former Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop cited domestic violence as the single greatest
health hazard for women in the United States.'
The focus of this article is on the failure of American law to accept
the reality facing battered woman. This failure consequently renders the
existing paradigms of self-defense and necessity inapplicable to her. The
author argues that the inception of the battered woman syndrome (BWS) is
superfluous. Such superfluity is evidenced by Germany's innovative
interpretation of the imminency requirement which accommodates the
unique situation of battered women who kill in nonconfrontational
settings. 5
Part II of this article examines the historical treatment of women's
legal rights in the United States and then narrates the experiences of a
battered woman.
Part III analyzes the problems associated with
accommodating the battered woman within the existing laws of the United
States. Part IV discusses the birth of the BWS and its legal and societal
repercussions. Part V suggests that the BWS, advocated by feminists, is
potentially detrimental to the battered woman within the legal context
because it depicts them as sick or crazy rather than legally justified.
Finally, part VI delves into German law and discusses how it utilizes a
more flexible definition of imminency and then uses this definition in its
defense of necessity for battered women who kill their mates in nonconfrontational settings.

II.

BATTERED WOMEN IN

AMERICA

In order to fully understand the legal and social implications of
BWS, one must first understand the social context in which battered
women live. The United States patterns most of its law on the English
Common Law, which in the seventeenth century openly permitted
husbands to physically abuse their wives.6 At one time, the only restriction
3. Fact Sheet on: Gender Violence, A Statisticsfor Action Fact Sheet, (Int'l Women's Trib.
Ctr./United Nations Dev. Fund for Women Res. Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 1992, at 1-2.
4.

BEAN, supra note 1, at 137.

5.
See B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to
Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DUKE 1. COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 194-95
(1991).

6. See Schuler v. Henry, 94 P. 360, 368 (Colo. 1908) (at common law "[tlhe husband
hath, by law, power and dominion over his wife, and may keep her by force within the bounds of
duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel manner"); see also Queen v. Jackson, 1
Q.B. 671 (1891) (stating that the law recognized a husband's right to chastise his wife
physically).
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placed on the beating a woman received from her husband was that the
weapon he used be no thicker than his thumb.'
At common law, it was legally impossible for husbands to rape
their wives.8 The marital rape exemption allowed husbands to force sexual
intercourse upon their wives, at any time, for the duration of their
marriage. The exemption was premised on any one of the following four
common law theories: (1) the marriage contract or implied consent theory;9
(2) the chattel theory;' (3) the unity principle;" or (4) the marriage
doctrine.,2

These theories were premised on the notion that should the wife be
"tempted to assert rights in opposition to her husband, the law humanely
divests her of [these] rights."" Such subjugating doctrines illustrate the
history from which American law was born. As of 1978, the marital rape
exemption remained intact and was applicable so long as there existed a
valid marriage.14 Today, approximately forty states continue to employ
6
some form of marital rape exemption."' Because the 19' Amendment'
conferred upon women the right to vote and rendered such theories
7. See Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 49 F. Supp. 625, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1943)
(stating in dicta that historically "a husband had a right to whip his wife, provided he used a
switch no larger than his thumb").
8. In the seventeenth century, Lord Matthew Hale theorized husbands as being legally
incapable of raping their wives. "[Tihe husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (S. Emlyn ed., 1778). See People v. Meli, 193
N.Y.S. 365, 366 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1922) (citing to the New York Penal Law and concluding that
the exemption existed "on account of the matrimonial consent which [the wife] has given, and
which she cannot retract"). This theory is broadly titled the marital rape exemption. See
generally Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 307 (1977) (commenting
that it was Hale's proclamation which introduced the marital rape exemption to the United
States).
9. By marrying, the woman irrevocably consented to sexual intercourse and had no legal
right to refuse sex.. Hampton, 49 F. Supp. at 632.
10. Wives were considered chattel; property which the husband could treat as he deemed
fit.
11. Husbands and wives were considered one person and the wife's identity was
completely merged into her husband's. The legal rationale was that one could not rape oneself.
12. The man, by marrying his victim, could escape rape charges.
See SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 8 (1975).

13. Schuler, 94 P. at 360.
14. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).
15. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & SANFORD H.
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 393 (5th ed. 1989).

16.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.

KADISH,

CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS

238

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 2:235

obsolete, legal scholars invented new theories to justify the marital rape
exemption. These scholars contended that a marital rape would be very
difficult to prove and could lead to falsified stories fabricated by vindictive
wives.1 7 It is particularly telling that in no other area of American
jurisprudence has the potential for perjured testimony or a fabricated
complaint led to the preclusion of a cause of action in toto.
Although these theories were abolished many years ago, one still
ponders if the philosophies that fostered their birth are still at work today.
This glimpse into America's history of blatant female subjugation and
man's legal right to physically abuse "his woman" provides insight into the
legal and social battle that battered women have had to fight. One battered
woman, in particular, suffered such cruel violence at the hands of her
husband that she came close to dying on several occasions. Ultimately,
she felt the only way to save herself was to kill her husband.
For example, Betty and Carl Hundley had been married for ten
years., ' Betty's accounts of the marriage sound more like that of a
prisoner of war than a blissful wedlock. During their marriage, Carl
knocked several of Betty's teeth loose, broke her nose many times, and
threatened to cut her eyes out and cut off her head.' 9 Betty suffered from
diabetes which laid a fertile ground for Carl to play his sadistic games. 2
He would often hide her insulin or, if he was feeling particularly playful,
would dilute it with water.' Needless to say, Betty drifted into diabetic
22
comas on numerous occasions.
Six weeks before Carl's death, Betty moved to a local motel in an
attempt to escape the abuse.23 Carl immediately began harassing her with
death threats directed at her and her family.23 Betty, fearing for her life,
began carrying a gun.Y On the day of the shooting, Carl warned Betty he
was going to kill her that night. 26 That evening, he broke into Betty's
motel room while she was in the bathroom. 7 He forced her into the
shower with him where he proceeded to shave her pubic hair in a rough
17.

See SCHULHOFER & KADISH, supra note 15, at 394.

18. State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23.

Hundley, 693 P.2d at 475.

24. Id. at 476.
25.

Id.

26. Id.
27. Id.
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and brutal manner, severely cutting her. 28 This sadistic gesture was
followed by a brutal rape.2 9 Afterward, Carl threw a dollar bill at her and
while holding a beer bottle in his hand, demanded she go fetch him some
cigarettes. 0 In the past, Carl had severely beaten Betty with a beer bottle.'
She retrieved the gun from her purse believing another beating, or worse,
was forthcoming. 32 Carl responded, "You are dead, bitch, now!" 3 As he
reached for the beer bottle, Betty closed her eyes and slowly squeezed the
4
trigger.1
Betty is now serving two to five years in prison for an involuntary
manslaughter conviction. Although the sentence may appear quite lenient
for the crime of murder, it also appears particularly harsh for a person
who justifiably kills in self-defense or out of necessity. Betty's case was
appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court on the issue of whether the jury's
instructions constituted reversible error regarding use of the word
"immediate" rather than "imminent."35
The Kansas Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case. Quite disturbing, however, is the
language of the dissent. The dissent noted that the couple was not in an
isolated area where help was unattainable. "At the very least, defendant
would have had a five minute head start on the defendant had she failed to
return with the cigarettes." 36 Unfortunately, this false perception that a
battered woman is free to leave safely undermines her credibility and
ultimately her chances of successfully pleading self-defense.

III. MURDER DEFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES
Legally, the syndrome is used to assist the jury in determining
whether the woman acted in self-defense with respect to the elements of
imminency and reasonableness. 7 The syndrome is seen as necessary to
explain these elements to a jury. Most states require that the defendant
28. Hundley, 693 P.2d at 476.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Hundley, 693 P.2d at 476.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 481.
37. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981) (stating that expert
testimony was offered to assist the jury in determining the credibility of the defendant's testimony
that she believed she was in imminent danger when she shot her husband allegedly in selfdefense).
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reasonably believe that the perpetrator's violence is imminent. The present
United States interpretation of imminency effectively excludes women
from asserting self-defense when they kill in non-confrontational situations.
For example, the situation where the man is asleep and the women kills
him is not considered self-defense. This exclusion is based on the premise
that if the man is asleep, or has his back turned, the force used by the
woman could not be "immediately necessary" and is thus excessive.
Furthermore, a woman was not in immediate danger and could have
escaped any violence she believed to be forthcoming. "Criminal homicide
constitutes murder when: a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or b)
it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life." 38 Self-defense is defined as:
"[t]he use of force upon or toward another person [that] is justifiable when
[she] believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting [her]self against the use of unlawful force, by such other person
on the present occasion. 3 9 As will be discussed below, several problems
arise when the law of self-defense in the United States is applied to
battered women who kill their mates in non-confrontational settings.4
The Model Penal Code uses a subjective test of reasonableness
rather than an objective standard. The subjective standard allows the jury
to evaluate whether the defendant's reaction was reasonable in light of her
experiences with the deceased. The standard enables the jury to see, hear,
and feel through the eyes of the battered woman and to understand how the
systematic abuse influenced her. In most jurisdictions, the defendant must
prove the following four elements to establish a defense of self-defense:
(1) the defendant was not at fault in provoking the difficulty which resulted
in the killing;41 (2) the defendant reasonably believed she was in imminent
danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony;41 (3) the killing was

38.
39.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1994).
Id. § 3.04(1); see Kinard v. United States, 96 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding that

the essence of self-defense is the reasonable belief of the imminence of death or great bodily
harm); see also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820) (holding that the
danger must be imminent and the resistance necessary to avoid the danger).
40. In marital and inter-relationship homicides, self-defense motivates women seven times

as often as it motivates the men, the latter being typically motivated by jealousy. DEL MARTIN,
BATERED WIVES 14 (1976).

41. See United States v. Hart, 162 F. 192 (C.C.D. Fla. 1908) (holding that where a
defendant is responsible for instigating the danger, the defendant cannot raise the defense of selfdefense).
42. See United States v. Outerbridge, 27 F. Cas. 390 (C.C.D. Cal. 1868) (No. 15,978)
(holding that imminent danger is the equivalent to immediate danger).
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necessary to save herself from the danger; 3 and (4) the defendant did not
violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger." These requirements of
self-defense raise several issues that are critical to a battered woman
accused of murdering her spouse. As described below, the inadequacy of
traditional defenses in this context have led to the use of BWS.
IV.

IMMINENCY

Perhaps the most significant hurdle the battered woman has to
overcome is proving that the danger she perceived was imminent. Often,
the battered woman is forced to attack while her mate is off guard,
typically while he is asleep . 5 The woman logically concludes, based on
the disparity of size and strength and her husband's violent history, that the
only way she will survive is to kill him while he is sleeping or otherwise
unaware. However logical it may seem, it is legally impossible to
conclusively establish that the man, upon awakening, would have resumed
the beating.
Despite the testimony to neighbors, police, attending hospital
physicians, family members, and the battered woman herself, with regards
to the beatings that she repeatedly sustained and undoubtedly would sustain
again, none of these credible witnesses has psychic abilities enabling them
to inform a jury that the battered woman was justified in "reasonably"
believing that she was in "imminent" danger of death or serious bodily
harm. The thoughts of the dissent in State v. Hundley are representative of
many people and do possess some validity. That is, if the battered
woman's mate was sleeping, why could she not simply leave? In an
attempt to overcome this obstacle, some defense attorneys, in an effort to
secure an acquittal for their client (a battered woman), attempt to prove
that the words "imminent" and "immediate" are not synonyms; they in
fact have two very different meanings.46 Defense attorneys argue that
"imminent," rather than "immediate," should be used in the jury
43. See Wiltberger, 18 U.S. at 76 (holding that the danger must be imminent and
necessary).
44. See United States v. Herbert, 2 Hay. & Haz. 210 (Crim. Ct. D.C. 1856) (No.
15,354a) (holding that from the moment danger becomes evident a person is required to retreat
unless she is prevented from doing so).
45. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989) (wife shot husband in the back of
the head while he lay asleep); see also Hundley, 693 P.2d at 476 (wife shot husband in the back

during a lull in a violent confrontation).
46. Imminent refers to an event which is "mediate rather than immediate; close rather than
touching; impending; on the [verge] of happening." Hundley, 693 P.2d at 515. Immediate is
defined as "[piresent; at once; without delay; not delayed by any interval of time." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 514-15 (6th ed. 1991).
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instructions"7 because the former allows for some flexibility with regard to
the time requirement. '
The Model Penal Code diverges from the
"imminent" syntax and instead describes the use of force in self-protection
as such force that is "immediately necessary . . . on the present

occasion. ""
There has been conflicting commentary as to whether the Model
Penal Code language actually alters the time element. For example, one
commentator noted that there was essentially little difference between the
Model Penal Code formulation and the traditional "imminence"
requirement, 1 while other scholars have argued that the Model Penal Code
does liberalize the durational requirement. 5' Regardless of which term is
applicable," all United States jurisdictions require that in order for selfdefense to be operable, the defensive action must be in response to an
attack which is present, thereby precluding any preemptive attacks. 3 The
time gap permitted between the provoking attack and the defensive action
is minimal.
The jury's belief ultimately turns on the element of
reasonableness. Simply put, the jury must believe that the woman faced an
impending danger.

47. See Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 373-74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (stating
that the defendant "attempts to cloud [the] issue with a semantical smoke screen regarding alleged
differences between the time frames encompassed by the terms 'immediate' and 'imminent'").
See also State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 571 (Kan. 1986) (asserting that "[the word 'immediate'
places undue emphasis on the decedent's immediate conduct and obliterates" the sheer terror that
the decedent invoked in the heart of the defendant during years of systematic abuse).
48. Hodges, 716 P.2d at 570-71; contra Grove, 526 A.2d at 373-74 (stating that the
defense attorney arguing that use of the word "imminent" gleaned from case law rather than the
statutory phrase "immediately necessary . . . on the present occasion" in the jury instructions
constituted reversible error because the statutory phrase is more lenient with regard to duration
than the case law term "imminent").
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1994).
50. See Sarah B. Vandenbraak, Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent
IntramaritalAssaults, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 643, 650-53 (1979); see also Grove, 526 A.2d at 374
(holding that the Model Penal Code's formulation of "immediately necessary" was not an
expansion of time frame encompassed by the case law term "imminent").
51. Nancy Fiora-Gormally, Comment, Battered Wives Who Kill: Double Standard Out of
Court, Single Standard In?, 2 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 133, 159 (1978) (contending that the Model
Penal Code version permits a defense for battered women that would be precluded by the rigid
requirements of the traditional approach).
52. For a complete list of jurisdictions which only allow self-defense where the threat is
"imminent," see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(2) n.27 (1984).
53.
1986).

See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §5.7(d) (2d ed.
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V. REASONABLENESS
A second obstacle the battered woman has to overcome is
convincing a jury she was in imminent danger and her belief in that danger
was reasonable. ' This obstacle is compounded by the test typically
employed to determine whether the battered woman's belief was
reasonable. Many states apply an objective rather than a subjective
standard." The test requires the jury to find that a "reasonable man"
would have acted in the same way as the defendant, had he been
confronted with the same circumstances, and that the force used was
reasonable in those circumstances.
The application of an objective standard would be appropriate, in
order to determine whether the battered woman's actions were culpable, if
the determination were being made in a vacuum. However, her life and
the cyclical events which precipitated her actions should provide the
context for which her actions are to be judged. In order for the jury to be
equipped to decide whether a "reasonable man" would have acted
similarly, that "reasonable man" would have to have been subjected to the
same inhumane treatment as the battered woman. As soon as the jury
instructions are uttered, the battered woman is at a distinct disadvantage if
6
she is in a jurisdiction which employs the objective test of reasonableness.
The existing legal doctrines of justifiable self-defense simply are not
7
designed for the special circumstances surrounding the battered woman.
Consequently, women are typically forced to seek alternative defenses
such as incapacity. 8
Battered women have been likened to hostages and prisoners of
war. 9 When the woman eventually resorts to homicide, one cannot
equitably make a determination that she was acting unreasonably unless the

54. Kinard, 96 F.2d at 522 (asserting that the essence of self-defense is that the defendant's
belief that he is in imminent danger be reasonable and bona fide).

55. The majority of American courts have not adopted a subjective view of reasonableness
in self-defense cases. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 154 (1968); see generally Phyllis L. Crocker,

The Meaning of Equalityfor Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 121 (1985).
56. See generally ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, DESCRIBING AND CHANGING WOMEN'S
SELF-DEFENSE WORK AND THE PROBLEM OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERING (1986).
57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59. Hundley, 693 P.2d at 477; see also Suzanne Steinmetz, Wife Beating: A Critique and
Reformulation of Existing Theory, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 322, 327 (1978).

Dr.

Steinmetz likens being systematically battered over a long period of time to brainwashing which
is made possible by extreme isolation.

through that of her abuser. Id.

Furthermore, the woman's only means of validation is
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person understands the context from which she acts. The fact finder must
look through the eyes of the battered woman, know what she knows and
feel what she feels. The woman, because of her long history with the
decedent, possesses a unique knowledge about his temperament and violent
propensities which the jury does not possess. In order to mitigate the
obvious harshness that an omission of such evidence would produce, some
courts have admitted the decedent's prior bad acts with regard to the
defendant.6
The reason why the element of reasonableness is so problematic is
that often the battered woman kills in a non-confrontational setting; for
example, while the man is sleeping.61 The argument follows that if the
decedent was asleep, how could the defendant's belief that she was in
imminent danger be reasonable. Some courts have gone further and held
that if the decedent was attacking but unarmed, the defendant's belief that
her use of deadly force was reasonable will almost always be deemed
It is crucial that the battered woman establish that,
unreasonable.62
although the man was not presently attacking her when she killed him, she
nevertheless was certain that if she failed to take action the abuse would
resume or that she would be killed.63 Without this evidence, the jury is left
to ask the obvious but difficult question, "Why didn't she just leave?"
VI. DUTY TO RETREAT
The self-defense laws in America have long recognized the duty of
a defendant to retreat rather than resort to killing her assailant. The retreat
rule falls into two basic categories. First, the duty to retreat where the
attack is made outside of the victim's home. The majority of jurisdictions
have adopted a "true men stand their ground" rule which places no
requirement for the person to retreat but rather allows her to stand her
ground and retaliate if she has been attacked." However, in a minority of
jurisdictions, if the assailant manifests an intent to cause seriously bodily
injury or kill, then the person must retreat, if she can do so with complete
safety, before resorting to killing her assailant.6 5
60. People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 302-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
61. See, e.g., State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the
killing was not justified because the argument between the woman and the decedent had ended a
few minutes prior to the killing and the decedent was unarmed at the time).
62. Commonwealth v. Jones, 332 A.2d 464, 466 (Pa. 1974).
63. See generally People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); State v.
Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 163-64 (Wis. 1983).
64. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 337 (1921).
65. Id.
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The second category of the retreat rule is the defense of habitation
which is an exception to the general duty to retreat. The defense is
premised on the common law concept that a man's home is his castle and
that requiring a person to flee the very place where he feels safest6 is
tantamount to legalizing burglary. Since the assailant is attacking in the
victim's home, the victim is allowed slightly more latitude to defend
himself.6 Typically, the elements necessary to prove the defense are the
following: "1) an aggressor unjustifiably threatens [the actor's] habitation
or premises; and 2) the actor engages in conduct harmful to the aggressor,
a) when and to the extent necessary to protect [his] habitation or premises,
b) that is reasonable in relation to the harm threatened."" Additionally,
where. the assailant and the defendant are both habitants of the same
premises, the defendant still need not retreat.6 9 This situation arises in the
case of roommates, business partners sharing the same office, 0 or
husbands and wives cohabitating.11
Recall the Kansas couple, Betty and Carl Hundley. Prior to the
night of the shooting, Carl had issued repeated death threats to Betty, and
fearing for her life, she began carrying a gun. The night of the killing,
Carl stalked his wife Betty and then followed her to her hotel room and
broke down the locked door. A person's place of dwelling is broadly
defined for purposes of the retreat rule." Practically any place that a
person uses as her temporary or permanent abode can qualify as a place of
dwelling. Betty's hotel room was her home, for purposes of the retreat
rule, however temporary the living arrangement may have appeared. As a
consequence, she had no duty to retreat (flee the hotel room). As a result
of the continuous and systematic abuse she had sustained, coupled with the
66. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704.5(1) (1994) ("The citizens of Colorado have a
right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. ").
67. See State v. Bissonnette, 76 A. 288, 290 (Conn. 1890) (reiterating the general rule
"that where he, without fault himself, is assaulted in his dwelling house, he need not retreat from
his assailant," but may kill his assailant); Brinkley v. State, 8 So. 22 (Ala. 1890) ("An assailed
person is not bound to retreat from his own house to avoid killing his assailant even though a
retreat could be safely made.").
68. ROBINSON, supra note 52, § 135.
69. See Hutcheson v. State, 54 So. 119, 120 (Ala. 1910) (holding that a party who is
forcibly attacked in their own home is under no obligation to retreat).
70. See State v. Gordon, 122 S.E. 501, 503 (S.C. 1924) (holding that where business
partners jointly occupy the same premises, each being equally entitled to possession, and where
one is attacked by the other, retreat is not necessary).
71. See Eversole v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W. 496, 499 (Ky. 1914) (holding that where a
husband threatens to kill his wife if she does not leave the home, the wife is entitled to remain).
72. See Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 550 (1896) (explaining that "the hotel or
temporary stopping place of a man may be regarded as his dwelling place").
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death threats she and her family had received from Carl," Betty logically
concluded that in order to save her life she had no choice but to kill the
intruder that had just broken into her "home" and raped her. Ironically,
this burglar and rapist was none other than her husband.
The facts of Betty's case can be analogized to those of Brown v.
United States.71 In Brown, the defendant, a male, shot and killed another
man, Hermis, whom he had had trouble with for some time.' There was
testimony that Hermis had assaulted Brown with a knife on two prior
occasions and issued death threats to Brown declaring "that the next time,
one of them would go off in a black box."76 Frightened by the death
threats, Brown began to carry a pistol. On the day of the killing, Brown
and Hermis, while working at an excavation cite, began to argue. Hermis,
once again, advanced toward Brown wielding a knife. Brown retrieved his
pistol and, while Hermis continued to attack, Brown fired four shots and
killed him.
The judge instructed the jury as follows: "[It is necessary to
remember, in considering the question of self-defense, that the party
assaulted is always under the obligation to retreat so long as retreat is open
to him, provided that he can do so without subjecting himself to the danger
of death or great bodily harm."" Furthermore, "[u]nless retreat would
have appeared to a man of reasonable prudence, in the position of the
defendant, as involving danger of death or serious bodily harm the
defendant was not entitled to stand his ground."' 8 The duty to retreat was
9
operable because the attack was not commenced at the defendant's home.7
Notwithstanding the foregoing instructions, Justice Holmes
perceptively posited that "the failure to retreat is a circumstance to be
considered with all the others in order to determine whether the defendant
went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical proof of
guilt."80 To summarize, a person being attacked may stand their ground if
they reasonably believe that they are in jeopardy of serious bodily harm or
death. However, this privilege to stand ones ground must be considered
within the totality of circumstances.
73. See Hundley, 693 P.2d at 477 (describing Betty's brother-in-law's testimony that Carl
threatened everyone in the family and that "his threats were to be taken seriously").
74.

Brown, 256 U.S. at 335.

75. Id. at 342.
76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id.

79. Brown, 256 U.S. at 335.
80. Id.at 343 (emphasis added).
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The two cases differ in that Betty was in her "home" and Brown
was at his place of employment.
Also, Brown was presently being
attacked when he defended himself. Betty, however, according to the selfdefense laws as presently drafted, was not presently under attack. Recall
that Carl had his back turned to Betty and the beating had temporarily
lulled. Another distinguishing factor, although not greatly significant, is
that Betty's assailant was her husband whereas Brown's assailant was an
associate. More significant, however, is that Brown and Hermis were both
men, thus potentially being of approximately equal stature; whereas, Betty,
a diabetic female worn from years of abuse, was clearly more frail than
her assailant. Accepting that Betty's hotel room was her "home," she was
under no duty to retreat.' Brown, however, did have a duty to retreat
when the assailant manifested an intent to cause him serious bodily harm
because Brown was not in his home. Betty received a sentence of two to
five years in prison. Brown's conviction of second degree murder was
reversed,'2 as Justice Holmes revealed that "[d]etached reflection cannot be
demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." 83
Although Carl Hundley did not have a gun or a knife, in Betty's
eyes the uplifted beer bottle was the source of prior brutal beatings and
was thus the functional equivalent to a deadly weapon. To take this
illustration one step farther, suppose that after Carl raped Betty he took a
nap, rather than demanding that she go fetch him some cigarettes.
Further, suppose that Carl had a history of initiating further rounds of
beatings upon awakening from drunken slumbers. Would the law require
Betty to stand idly by and patiently await her next beating? Would the law
require her to leave her own home that had been broken into by a rapist?
Or, would the law recognize what Justice Holmes recognized in 1921?
That is, "the failure to retreat . . . is not a categorical proof of guilt.","
Rather, it must be considered along with all the other circumstances
peculiar to that defendant.
This example is offered to illustrate the seemingly inequitable
treatment that men and women receive with regard to the fundamentally
same crime: killing their assailant who has a history of assaulting and
threatening them. 5 These crimes are fundamentally and not legally the
81.

Id. at 344 (asserting that although Brown's place of work was outside, it was his place

of work nonetheless, thus allowing the retreat rule to apply).
82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 343.

84.

Brown, 256 U.S. at 335.

85.

Historically, self-defense theories were created by, and developed for, men to allow

them to legally defend themselves, their family, and their home from the aggression of other men
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same, because the two crimes are legally disparate. In the eyes of the law,
Betty did not kill in self-defense because Carl had his back turned away
from her at the time of the attack. The law in the United States interprets
any lapse of time between the provocation and the killing as a cooling off
period, thereby giving the defendant time to reflect. This time for
reflection is seen as running counter to the spontaneity required by the law
of self-defense. In Brown, there was no time to reflect because the
defendant killed while he was actually being attacked by the victim. In
contrast, Betty killed her husband after the attack had ended. However
Betty believed that the uplifted beer bottle was just as threatening as a
knife and that at any moment the beating would resume.
The imminency of the danger should not be discounted merely
because it had briefly subsided. This brief interval of tranquillity is
typically nothing more than a lull in the ongoing beating.86 Furthermore,
the woman continues to experience a sense of impending danger during
these lulls because of the cyclical nature of the physical and emotional
abuse she has sustained over the years.8 7 The traditional rules of selfdefense in the United States are unjust when applied to battered women
because they do not accommodate this lull. 88 The subsequent sections will
discuss other defenses available under U.S. law and how they are applied
within the BWS context.
VII. PROVOCATION
The defense of provocation does not absolve the defendant from all
criminal culpability; it merely reduces the charge from murder to
manslaughter. 9 In order to successfully assert provocation as a defense,
the defendant must prove that she acted while in the heat of passion, absent
time for reflection or for her blood to cool, and that the killing was a result
of equal size and strength. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trialfor Women: Sex Bias in
the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 635 (1980).
86. Lorraine P. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or to be Killed, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 895, 928-29 (1981).
87.

See Fennel v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating "the battered

woman lives with constant fear, coupled with a perceived [or actual] inability to escape."); see
also Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 91 (S.C. 1992) (citing Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 16

(Martin, J., dissenting, stating that "often the terror does not wane, even when the batterer is
absent or asleep")).

88. The force used to protect oneself from harm must be "immediately necessary."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1994).
89. See United States v. Lewis, 111 F. 630, 633 (C.C. Tex. 1901) (holding that "to reduce

the killing from murder to manslaughter, the provocation . . . must have been reasonable and
recent, for no words or slight provocation will be sufficient; and, if the [defendant] has had time
to cool, malice will be inferred, and the homicide will be murder").
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of the decedent's provocations.90 Also, the provocation cannot be slight in
nature, such as mere words. 91
This defense is not discussed in depth because it is merely a
mitigating defense, rather than a complete exculpatory defense.u
Furthermore, the time requirement becomes problematic once again. If
the battered woman attacks while the man is sleeping, the law interprets
this as time for her blood to cool after the provoking incident. Thus, the
argument follows that if the decedent was asleep, the woman had time for
reflection and the killing was thus committed out of malice, not out of heat
of passion.
VIII. NECESSITY
The defense of necessity applies where the defendant was forced to
break the law in order to protect herself or someone else from the harm
that is sought to be avoided. 93 If compliance with the law would produce a
greater harm than violation of the law the defendant is justified in violating
the law for social policy reasons.Y The defendant is said to be obligated to
pick the lessor of two evils. The harm sought to be avoided must be
created by natural forces in order for the defense of necessity to be

90. Id.
91. See United States v. Wiltberger, 28 F. Cas. 727, 730 (C.C. Pa. 1819) (No. 16, 738)
(holding that "[n]o words-no gestures, however insulting and irritating" will constitute sufficient
provocation).
92. See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 953 (1984) (explaining that the battered woman
kills her husband and relies on self-defense rather than provocation "given the central place of
self-defense in Anglo-American jurisprudence and the crucial role it can play in justifying-not
merely mitigating-what would otherwise have been a criminal act").
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1994).
(1). Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that:
(a). the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and...
(2). When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring
a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the
justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for
which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
Id.
94. See generally Edwards B. Arnolds & Normand F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity
in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289
(1974); Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949); W.
H. Hitchler, Necessity as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 33 DICK. L. REV. 138 (1929).
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applicable. If, however, the harm sought to be avoided is created by
human forces, then the applicable defense is duress. 9
Although the catalyst for each defense seems quite distinct,
contemporary cases have blurred the distinction between necessity and
duress.96 The majority of modem criminal statutes have followed the lead
of the Model Penal Code and embraced a broader choice of evils defense.
The broader version does not limit the evil to any particular source, be it
natural or human. Such a broadening is logical because a limit on the
applicability of necessity based on the fortuity of the source of the evil
(natural or human) is completely irrelevant in determining why the
defendant acted in the first place.9 However, one distinction between the
two defenses has remained intact. The defense of necessity voids the
existence of the requisite mens rea for the crime at issue, whereas duress
voids the existence of the requisite actus reus because the defendant was
not acting of his own free will. 9
IX. REQUIREMENTS OF THE BROADER CHOICE OF EvILs DEFENSE
The harm avoided need not be death or great bodily harm,
destruction of property may suffice. The harm avoided may be physical
harm to either the defendant himself, or someone else. It is not a
requirement that the defendant's actions "promote the general welfare. "
The harm done is not limited exclusively to intentional homicide but also
includes unintentional homicides.'1 Furthermore, a reasonably anticipated

95. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1994).
(1). It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use,
unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(2). The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed
himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress.
The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a
situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.
Id.
96. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723
F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1984).
97. ROBINSON, supra note, 52 at §124(e)(1).
98. United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978).
99. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 53, at 446. Although case law reveals the mistaken
belief that such a promotion is a requirement, see Contento-Pachon which states that "Itihe
defense of necessity is usually invoked when the defendant acted in the interest of the general
welfare. 723 F.2d at 695.
100. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 53, at 446.
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connection between the defendant's conduct and the harm avoided must
exist. In order to assert the defense of necessity, the actor must be aware
that his actions were necessary to avoid the evil.,,,,
The test used to determine the relativeness of the harm avoided
and the harm done is objective. This is logical because the defendant may
consider, for example, her dog's life to be more valuable than a stranger's
life and thus kill the stranger in order to preserve the life of her cherished
pet. However, the dog's life is objectively less valuable than the human
life thereby precluding the defense of necessity. Simply put, the harm
sought to be avoided must be greater than the harm done.'0

The defense of necessity will not apply where the defendant could
have taken legal alternative action'0 1 or where the defendant acted to
prevent harm which was not imminent. Although the Model Penal Code
does not speak in terms of imminency,10 many jurisdictions have adopted
this as a requirement for the defense of necessity. For example, if the
defendant were to prevent a police officer from delivering radioactive
waste on the basis that such waste was a danger to his community, the
defendant could not assert necessity as a defense. The mere possibility
that the containers filled with the radioactive waste would deteriorate over
time, leaking the waste into the environment, does not constitute an
immediate threat. 0 5 This requirement is critical for the battered woman
because if the jury believes that leaving just prior to the killing was a
viable option, then the defense becomes inapplicable to her.

101.

Id.

102.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (1994).

103. See generally Bailey, 444 U.S. at 394 (explaining a defense of necessity could not be
used for a prisoner who escaped because legal alternatives to alleged intolerable conditions had
not been exhausted); Bice v. State, 34 S.E. 202 (Ga. 1899) (explaining that a defendant who
violated criminal statute prohibiting the use of alcohol in church by bringing whisky into church
claiming such usage was for medicinal purposes was precluded from asserting necessity because
defendant could have stayed home); Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1979) (explaining that
the defendants could have beckoned a tow truck, therefore, there was no necessity to steal
equipment to free their truck from the mud).
104.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1994).

105. See State v. Chisholm, 882 P.2d 974, 977 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
necessity may only be asserted to prevent a harm that is reasonably perceived as immediately
dangerous and that "itmay not be used to foreclose speculative, debatable or long-term risks");
see also State v. Baker, 598 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that one of the
elements of the defense of necessity is "a present and imminent danger"); People v. Heath, 207
Cal. App. 3d 892, 901 (1989) (stating that "the necessity defense .
contemplates a threat in the
immediate future").
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APPLICATION OF NECESSITY TO BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

The defense of necessity does not apply to the battered woman in
the United States for several reasons. First, killing one life to save another
cannot necessarily be deemed to be picking the lessor of two lives. All
lives are equally valuable in the eyes of the law. Second, the law
recognizes a legal alternative: society feels she could have safely left.
Finally, there is the problem of imminency, or lack thereof. If the
decedent was sleeping at the time of the killing, it cannot be said that the
defendant acted to prevent imminent harm. Due to the significant
problems battered women have had in asserting self-defense, feminist
psychologists have recognized the need to explain to juries why she was
forced to ultimately kill her spouse.
XI. THE SYNDROME

In the late 1970's, American psychologists developed a theory
known as the "battered woman syndrome" (BWS) in an effort to explain
the reactionary behavior of women who are exposed to repeated and
prolonged abuse.""' BWS is most identified with the work of Dr. Lenore
Walker, a renowned psychologist who has dedicated her life to the
treatment of battered women.' °0 The phrase "battered woman" has become
so commonplace that in 1979 it was added to the International
Classification of Diseases Clinical Modification Scheme.10° Dr. Walker
applied a theory, hypothesized by Dr. Segilman, known as "learned
helplessness. "'0 This theory was developed by issuing a series of electric
shocks to dogs and documenting their responses over a period of time. 10
Interestingly, after repeatedly attempting to escape the pain to no avail, the
dogs were conditioned to stop trying. This "learned helplessness" is used
by Dr. Walker to help explain the seemingly passive and complacent
attitude women adopt after years of abuse.

106.

See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).

107.

The following is a list of Dr. Walker's most popular works: LENORE E. WALKER,

THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
(1984); LENORE E. WALKER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON VICTIMS (1985); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY
BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY RESPONDS (1987); LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989).

108.

Alison Young, Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A ComparativeAnalysis, 31

OSGOODE HALL L.J. 761, 774 (1994).

109. Id. (citing M. Segilman, Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in the Dog, 256 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 265 (1965)).

110. Id.
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BWS involves three distinct phases."' Phase one, the "tensionbuilding phase," can be described as one in which the woman senses that
11 2
her husband is becoming progressively sensitive to any minor irritation.
Phase two is characterized as the "explosion" phase. Here, the man
physically and emotionally abuses his mate." 3 The beating could last
anywhere from fifteen minutes to several days. The third phase is titled
the "calm, loving, respite" phase.
Here, the husband promises
emphatically to never hurt her again. She believes him."4 The cycle then
repeats itself."'
XII.

BWS: LEGAL RECOGNITION OR PSYCHOLOGICAL
VICTIMIZATION?

By way of expert testimony many feminist psychologists and
researchers, such as Walker, feel their contribution has navigated the
judiciary toward a legally recognizable defense. 16 However, there is a
considerable faction who feel that the tidy label has stigmatized the
battered woman as sick or crazy and has further alienated the jury."' This
faction further posits that the battered woman is perfectly sane.
Proponents of the syndrome portray her psychological experience as
distinctive and akin only to Segilman's dogs. " 8 This contention of
distinctiveness is critical to the notion of a syndrome which is aberrant in
its nature. Critics of the syndrome, however, suggest that the battered
woman's behavior is neither sick nor atypical, but rather very analogous to
that of her non-battered cohorts who also attempt to separate from their
mates. "9
Loseke and Cahill have termed couples who are attempting to
separate as "uncoupling."'12 They assert that the prolonged "leaving and
111.

WALKER, supra note 106, at 65-66.

112. Id.

113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id.
116. See Margaret M. Prendergast, Evidence-The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on
Battered Woman Syndrome Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 341 (1992).
117. E.M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986).
118.

Young, supra note 108.

119. Id. at 804 (citing ELIZABETH COMACK, Legal Recognition of the 'Battered Wife
syndrome': A Victory for Women?, Address to the American Society of Criminology Meetings
(Nov. 1991)).
120.

Id.
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returning" cycle, which is alleged to be unique to the battered woman, is
in fact common to all couples attempting to sever ties from one another.,2',
Furthermore, the gamut of emotions, such as guilt, fear, depression, and
lowered self-esteem, that are purported to be unique to the battered
woman, are also characteristic of many men and women undergoing the
uncoupling process.'1 Thus, it is possible that the battered woman remains
not because of "learned helplessness," but because she is afraid to be alone
or because there is a part of her that still loves the father of her children,
or even still because a part of her believes she can change him.
But is this attitude necessarily a gender specific syndrome? Or is it
indicative of the majority of men and women who experience difficulties
breaking off a relationship? Estrich questions the necessity for a genderspecific defense. 23 She asserts there should not be a need for such a
syndrome.'1' Furthermore, legal practitioners and scholars would be more
beneficial to their clients if they worked at changing existing law to
accommodate the battered woman rather than using a syndrome which
titles her as sick or crazy. These altruistic motives, however, take time to
be effectuated.
The legislature does not redraft laws overnight.
Proponents of the syndrome reasoned that it would be much simpler to
introduce key evidence of the turbulent relationship via expert testimony
explaining a psychological syndrome than to have the legislature redraft
long-existing definitions of imminency and reasonableness.1 2 Meanwhile,
the battered woman finds herself in the midst of a legal sea of rigid
confines of which her behavior does not fit.1'2 Consequently, in order to
save her from a life sentence, her attorney does whatever is necessary,
however shortsighted, to preserve her freedom.
Is the battered woman crazy to think that her husband will murder
her if she attempts to leave the marital home? Numerous accounts of
battered women warn that she,12 and possibly her children,'1 have a far
121.

Id.

122. Id.
123. Young, supra note 108, at 805 (citing Susan Estrich, Defending Women, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1430 (1990)).
124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126.

Id.

127.

See Hodges, 716 P.2d at 566 (describing how husband beat defendant wife, breaking

her jaw, until she was unconscious because she left him and warned that if she ever left again he
would kill her); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (stating that husband beat
defendant wife threatening to dismember her if she ever left him again); State v. Gallegos, 719
P.2d 1269, 1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (describing how husband held loaded gun to defendant
wife head while threatening to kill her if she ever left him again).
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greater chance of being murdered if they attempt to leave the marital
home. 29 The misconception that the battered woman is able to freely and
safely escape the abuse without resorting to murder is prevalent. The
statistics, however, simply do not support this contention. 130
Labeling a woman who is beaten as a victim of a syndrome allows
the court to acquit her without conceding that the woman was legally
justified in killing her tormentor. Admittedly, it provides an explanation to
the jury as to why she did not leave.'"' However, the syndrome arguably
has the potential for alienating the jury'32 rather than providing them with
an intelligible explanation couched in cryptic psychological jargon telling
them why she stayed. Juries often "tune out" as soon as they hear
psychological jargon. Also, Americans are understandably becoming
more and more irritated with the abuse excuse.'33 Somehow they feel that
allowing women who have killed their spouse to use BWS as a justification
for their actions would be tantamount to giving women a license to kill.'

4

In reality, however, this fear is completely unwarranted. In 1990, out of
approximately 100 Ohio women who were serving prison sentences for
killing their battering spouses and who had their cases reviewed, only

128.

There is a strong correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse. WALKER, supra

note 106, at 61.
129. In 1987, researchers analyzed the results of the American homicide statistics compiled
by the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia and discovered that, in 35 states, the
number of women being murdered by their male partners had increased. In 25 of the 35 states,
most of the women were murdered after they divorced or separated from their mates. BEAN,
supra note 1, at 6.

130. The majority of battered women who are killed are killed after they separate from
their mate. BEAN, supra note 1.
131.

See Cara Yates, Self-Defense and the Battered Woman's Syndrome, 45 S.C. L. REV.

127 (1993).
132. Daniel Wolfe, head of the jury consulting firm Litigation Sciences, warns that
labeling the defendants as victims could backfire.

Jurors tend to engage in a behavior known as

the "defensive attribution." Jurors distance themselves from the violent behavior exhibited by the
defendant by asserting that they are incapable of such violence. Gail Appleson, Figure SkatingHarding, Bobbitt, Menendez Share Victim Strategy, Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.

133. "The 'He made me do it' defense is now expanding. We have the Menendez boys,
Erik and Lyle, from Beverly Hills arguing that they had no choice but to gun down their wealthy
parents." Rush Limbaugh, No tearsfor the Bobbitts-onlyfor America, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan.
22, 1994, at 2.
134. BEAN, supra note 1, at 165. Some Americans feel that allowing women who kill
their mates to use self-defense will result in "an open season on men." Elizabeth M. Schneider
& Susan B. Jordan, Representationof Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or
Sexual Assault, 4 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 141, 142 n.4 (1978).
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twenty-five were pardoned.'" Clearly, the American legal system is not
sending a message to society that it is "open season" on men.
With violent crimes exceeding manageable proportions, society
feels obligated to force perpetrators to take responsibility for their actions
rather than absolving them of all .ulpability by labeling them as victims.
The conservative argument is that the syndrome, along with all abuse
excuse types of defenses, is the equivalent to legalizing revenge.'3 6 In the
final analysis, the syndrome allows the court to benevolently bestow upon
women the status of insanity while simultaneously taking away her power
in the courtroom. One wonders how it is that the woman's husband has
been raping and brutally beating her and she is the one who is labeled sick.
Is he the perfect picture of cognitive and emotional health void of any
psychological pathology? One can almost hear the jury deliberating in the
jury room, "He obviously had a really bad temper . . . but her, she must
have been really sick to stay in a sadistic relationship like that!" The
question is not why didn't she leave, but rather why he did not let her go.
Some jurisdictions have, in fact, chosen not to accept the battered
woman's syndrome as a self-defense.'" Instead, they reasoned that the
syndrome does not involve insanity, emotional disability, or any other kind
of psychological pathology.'3 8 Rather, the syndrome, like any other
experience peculiar to the defendant, relates to the issue of the defendant's
honesty and reasonableness' 9 of her belief that she was in imminent danger
of serious bodily harm or death.' ° Therefore, there is no need for
evidence of the syndrome per se. Evidence of the woman's history is
admissible for its bearing on the defendant's reasonableness of her belief
that she was in imminent danger. Such jurisdictions, however, further
reasoned that while a woman's history of spousal abuse is a factor to be
considered when determining if her fear was reasonable, this consideration
does not negate the requirement of proving that the threat of injury was
imminent."' The problems associated with this requirement of imminency
has caused some legal scholars to look to other countries to see how their
legal systems have dealt with domestic violence.

-135. BEAN, supra note 1, at 165.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1.
Commonwealth v. Ely, 578 A.2d 540, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
State v. Myers, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
Reasonableness is the standard used in objective tests.

140.

Meyers, 570 A.2d at 1266.

141.

Grove, 526 A.2d at 373
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XIII. GERMAN LAW
While the law in the United States has provided the battered
woman with defenses such as self-defense, provocation, or temporary
insanity, Germany has taken a more progressive legal approach. Germany
has acknowledged the difficulties with the battered woman asserting selfdefense in non-confrontational settings because of the apparent lack of
imminency.
Although Germany, like the United States, traditionally
applied necessity to civil violations, its applicability in the criminal context
has been discussed extensively in scholarly German literature. Germany
has codified two classes of necessity: defensive and aggressive. The
governing German civil code, Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) section 904,
defines necessity as follows:
[T]he owner of property is not justified in prohibiting
another person from interfering with that property if that
interference is necessary to avoid a present danger and the
harm avoided thereby is disproportionately large in
relation to the damage suffered by the owner of the
property.
The owner can demand restitution for the
4 2
suffered.
damage
The foregoing section accommodates aggressive necessity. Under
aggressive necessity, as opposed to defensive necessity, the defendant is
permitted to damage another's property in an effort to protect herself or
her property from harm. The harm that the defendant is seeking to avoid,
however, does not stem from the property she is damaging; hence, the title
aggressive necessity. The German counterpart to aggressive necessity is
defensive necessity and is defined in BGB section 228 as follows:
[Olne who damages or destroys another's property in
order to avert a danger emanating from it to oneself or
another does not act wrongfully if the damage or
destruction is necessary to avoid the danger and is not
disproportionate thereto. If the actor is responsible for the
43
danger, he is liable for the damages. 1
Section 228 allows one to damage another's property in cases where
the danger is specifically caused by that property. The United States does
not distinguish between aggressive and defensive necessity; instead, it

142. Byrd, supra note 5, at 197 (citing Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [hereinafter BGB] § 904).
143. Id. at 198 (citing BGB § 228).
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distinguishes between public and private necessity.'" Where the act is for
the public good (e.g. shooting a rabid dog), the defense is absolute.'"4

Where, on the other hand, the act is solely to benefit a person or property
from destruction or serious injury, the defense is justified by the existence
of private necessity and is said to be qualified.'" This distinction leads to
monetary consequences. If the defense is private, it is qualified by the
amount of damage the defendant was responsible for causing.'" The actor
must pay for any damage that he caused.'" In the United States, the civil
justification of necessity is based on the maxim, "[niecessitas inducit
privilegium quod jura privata [necessity provides a privilege for private
rights]. "'149
Although defensive necessity seems almost identical to defense of
property, the two defenses are applied quite differently in Germany.'"° Selfdefense is applicable where the attack is present; whereas, defensive
necessity is applicable where the attack is imminent.
Another key
distinction is that with aggressive necessity, the actor may justifiably cause
damage to another's property only where that property's value is less than
the property being saved.' 5' Defensive necessity, on the other hand, is

144. See generally Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908); Newcomb v. Tisdale, 62 Cal.
575 (1881); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197, 263 (1965).

145. Private necessity is defined as "[olne is privileged to enter land in the possession of
another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting
an imminent public disaster." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965).
146.

Private Necessity

(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to (a) the actor, or his land

or chattels, or (b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, unless
the actor knows or has reason to know that the one for whose benefit he enters is
unwilling that he shall take such action.

(2) Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, he is subject to
liability for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege stated in Subsection (1) to
any legally protected interest in the possessor in the land or connected with it, except

where the threat of harm to avert which the entry is made is caused by the tortious
conduct or contributory negligence of the possessor.
Id. § 197 (1965).
147.

Id. § 197(2).

148.

Id.

149. Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
150. Byrd, supra note 5, at 199 (explaining that the BGB provides separate defenses for
defense of property in § 228 and self-defense in § 227).
151.

Id.
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justified in all situations so long as the property being damaged is not
disproportionately greater than the property being saved .l52
Germany's seemingly illogical application of defensive necessity
within the criminal context can be explained by its approach to self-defense
and excessive self-defense. Unlike the United States,' Germany allows for
use of excessive force statutorily. Specifically, section thirty-three of the
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) states that "[i]f the actor exceeds the limits of selfdefense because of confusion, fear, or fright [s]he is not to be punished." '
Section thirty-three provides for complete acquittal. Although this law may
appear vulnerable to abuse, it contains safeguards. The law still requires
the defendant to be in a situation that would justify self-defense. It simply
does not punish her for "overreacting." The rationale is fair, particularly in
the case of a battered woman. There are often situations where the battered
woman interprets any sign, however slight, as a signal that a beating is
about to occur. In this situation, if the battered woman overreacts and kills
her abuser, German law would not find this use of excessive force culpable
or punishable.
In contrast, United States law would find such overreaction
punishable and would deprive her from asserting self-defense, thus leaving
her open to a charge of manslaughter. Germany's heat of passion statute is
also much more amenable to battered women than the manslaughter statute
in the United States. Section 213 of the StGB provides: "[i]f, through no
fault of h[er] own, the manslaughterer was enraged through the victim's
mistreatment or serious defamation of the defendant h[er]self or of a
relative and thereby immediately aggravated to act . . . punishment of
between six months and five years shall be imposed."',
This statute
specifically recognizes the decedent's responsibility in bringing about his
own death due to his "mistreatment" of the defendant. In contrast, in the
United States the manslaughter statute focuses on the "reasonableness" of

152.

Id.

153. See State v. Bowens, 501 A.2d 577 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that
killing by excessive force in self-defense may constitute manslaughter, i.e., the defendant must
plead imperfect self-defense rather than perfect self-defense).

154. Byrd, supra note 5, at 184.
155.

Id.
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the defendant's actions5 6 and requires that the defendant acted out of
provocation and had no time to cool.'
German laws enable the courts to react to three distinct types of
battered women cases. The importance of the legal treatment is the
message that the court is sending to society. First, if the court finds that the
woman was in imminent danger and the force used was necessary, the court
can acquit her.'1 Here, the court is sending a message that individuals,
such as the defendant, may lawfully kill an aggressor.' 9 Such a message
has a powerful deterrent effect on would-be aggressors. Second, if it finds
that she was in imminent danger, but used excessive force, the court can
still acquit her.' 6 Here, the court is suggesting that while the defendant's
behavior is not condoned, it is nonetheless understandable and clearly not
blameworthy. Third, if the court finds that she was not in imminent
danger, but acted out of rage and hatred toward her abuser who provoked
his own death, the court can mitigate her punishment from murder to
manslaughter. Here, the court is conceding the blameworthiness of the
defendant's action, but is also recognizing that the decedent played a role in
provoking his own death.16 This compassionate approach is a common
theme throughout Germany's application and interpretation of its laws. The
remainder of this section discusses why Germany's criminal laws,
specifically defensive necessity, could more adequately accommodate
battered women than the United States' model of self-defense.
XIV. THE NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ATTACK
In 1979, the Bundersgerichtshof (the German High Court) was
confronted with a case which involved the following facts: For several
consecutive nights, a family was awakened by an intruder who would break
into their home and silently stand over them while they slept.162 The parents
reported the incidents to the police, but having insufficient leads, they were

156. "[A] homicide ... is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness ... shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation..." MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.3 (1994).
157.. Commonwealth v. Rivers, 557 A.2d 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth v.
Copeland, 554 A.2d 54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
158. Byrd, supra note 5, at 185.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 200.
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unable to apprehend the intruder. Frustrated and frightened, the parents
began keeping a loaded gun by their bedside.
On the night in question, the defendant discovered the intruder
hauntingly peering at himself and his wife. The defendant quickly grabbed
his gun and pursued the intruder out of the house and down the street. The
defendant warned the intruder that if he did not stop, the defendant would
shoot. The intruder refused to stop and the defendant shot and killed him.
The Bundesgerichtshof held that the defendant was justified in
killing the intruder based on necessity.' 63 The Court reasoned that the facts
clearly did not lend themselves to self-defense because the intruder was
fleeing and the confrontation had ended. Interestingly, the Court applied
aggressive, rather than defensive, necessity.
The Court decided that defensive necessity was not applicable. It
viewed the interests involved as the family's right to privacy versus the
safety of the intruder)" Keep in mind that the intruder never threatened
physical harm to any member of the family per se. Thus, the perceived
interest being threatened was mere privacy. Recall that for aggressive
necessity to be successfully plead, the harm sought to be avoided must be
greater than the harm done. The right to privacy, however, is arguably less
valuable than the right to live. In contrast, defensive necessity only
requires that the damage to the danger causing property be of not much
greater value than the property or interest being saved. Although the
intruder's safety is more valuable than the family's privacy interest, his
safety does not rise to the level of being "disproportionately" more
valuable, thereby negating the applicability of defensive necessity.161
Nevertheless, the Bundesgerichtshof applied aggressive, rather than
defensive, necessity.
The exact theory employed is not significant.
Significantly although the intruder was in the process of fleeing, and clearly
did not present any imminent danger to the defendant or his family, the
Court found the killing justified. The Bundesgerichtshof followed an
interesting time requirement which was rendered in an earlier decision. 16 It
held that an imminent danger can endure prolonged intervals, thereby
accommodating a threat of danger which may linger, rather than only the
instantaneous threat that is characteristic of confrontational attacks.
Currently, this liberal translation of imminency is prevalent in Germany. 67
163.

Byrd, supra note 5, at 200.

164.

Id. at 201.

165.

Id. at 198.

166.

Id. at 201.

167. See KARL LACKNER, STRAFGESETZBUCH MIT ERLAUTERUNGEN § 34, at 214 (Beck,
18th ed. 1989) [hereinafter StGB Erlauterigen] (explaining that danger, particularly within the
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This innovative interpretation is key for the battered woman. If the United
States courts would employ this interpretation of imminency in its version
of self-defense, the battered woman would stand a far better chance of
being acquitted for killing her husband in a non-confrontational setting.
XV. PREEMPTIVE ACTION
Many battered women strike preemptively. That is, rather than
waiting for the abuse to resume, they kill their assailant before he has the
chance to recommence the beatings. Recall Betty Hundley killing her
husband while his back was turned clutching the beer bottle. Her retaliation
would be considered a preemptive action because there had been a lull,
however brief, in the attack.16 This lull is accommodated by German law
and is treated as an ongoing danger created by the decedent.
Although Germany parallels the United States in disallowing selfdefense in cases where the danger was not imminent, Germany does allow
defensive necessity. Furthermore, Germany's liberal interpretation of
imminency results in defensive necessity being successfully plead in a
greater number of cases. In 1959, the Bundesgerichtshof was faced with an
interesting case involving false imprisonment. The facts are as follows. A
woman who was clinically diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic suffered
from hallucinations. '16 She believed that she was being threatened by devils
and that her daughter was trying to poison her. 7 o In an effort to avoid the
perceived danger, the woman would submerge portions of the family home
with holy water and would often flee the home half naked.'- The woman's
husband and daughter, in an effort to prevent further property damage,
confined the woman to her room against her will.17 2 The lower court found
the husband and daughter guilty of false imprisonment. '7
The
Bundesgerichtshof, however, reversed their convictions holding that a
situation of imminent danger can be ongoing; thereby, justifying preemptive
74
attacks if done in an effort to prevent future harm.
The result the Court reached was logical. The Court reasoned that
rather than require the defendants to sit idly by awaiting future damage,
BWS context, is subject to change at any time and is highly unpredictable), reprinted in Byrd,
supra note 5, at 201.
168. KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. §21-3214(3)(a) (Vernon 1993).
169. Byrd, supra note 5, at 204.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Byrd, supra note 5, at 204.
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they should be empowered to prevent the damage.",s The defendants were
in a uniquely intimate relationship with the victim making them aware of
her cycles of hysteria and hallucination. This insight and knowledge should
not be forced to be suppressed in order to oblige the rigid time constraints
of self-defense.
The Court stated that the defendant's actions were justified under a
theory of defensive necessity because the victim was the source of danger .176
The competing interests were the victim's right to move freely during her
hallucinogenic episodes versus the defendant's right to prevent permanent
property damage. 17 Arguably, the victim's rights during these episodes
were not disproportionately greater than those of the defendant's. The rule
to be extracted from this opinion is that the perceived danger need not be
immediate, imminent, or present.
It merely needs to be ongoing,
intermittent, or cyclical in nature. This common sense approach allows for
preemptive action.
Although the foregoing case did not involve self-defense, it did
involve the requirement of imminency. The same logic that was employed
there, can be employed in cases involving battered women. An individual
who is certain that she is about to incur great harm, whether such harm be
the flooding of one's home or a beating, should not be forced to stand idly
by and watch it take place. Arguably, the two interests being compared are
quite disproportionate: life versus property. However, the rationale is the
same and should not be discounted merely because of the disparity in the
interests involved.
If one were to apply this logic to the typical battered woman who
strikes in a non-confrontational setting, the result would be that she, in the
proverbial sense, no longer has her hands tied. She need not wait in
frightful anticipation for her mate to resume the abuse or, worse yet, to kill
her. Consider the absurd result if, in the above case, the Bundesgerichtshof
would have only considered necessity with its traditional requirements of
imminency. The victim's husband and daughter, to avoid criminal charges
of false imprisonment, would be forced to stand idly by and watch the
woman literally inundate their home. Or, perhaps the woman might receive
a spontaneous bulletin from her hallucinated companions and feel convinced
that the only way to be free of the demons is to set the house on fire.
Clearly, this result is illogical.

175.

Id. at 205.

176.

Id.

177.

Id.
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GERMANY'S INTERPRETATION OF IMMINENCY:

IDEAL FOR

THE BATTERED WOMAN

Germany's interpretation of imminency is ideal for the battered
woman who kills her husband in a nonconfrontational setting, i.e., while he
lay asleep. This definition need not be applied to the United States law of
necessity, but rather to the United States law of self-defense. As currently
drafted and interpreted, the United States self-defense law, while
conceptually appealing, is legally inappropriate because of the requirement
that the attack be imminent. Arguably, however, legislation may not be
necessary. The term "imminency" could remain intact and all that would
be needed is a new interpretation of the word to include lulls. On the other
hand, this interpretation could be viewed by the judiciary as too radical of a
departure from the traditional concepts of imminency; thereby, requiring
legislation. If legislation were to be enacted, it should reflect the German
interpretation of imminency which lengthens the time requirement so that
the attack need not be present, but rather ongoing.
With such a statue in place, a woman who knows that her husband
upon wakening usually initiates a beating would be justified in preventing
the beating and defending herself by using deadly force. The husband's
slumber would be seen as a lull in the attack, rather than a complete
cessation. The entire relationship could be viewed as one cyclical, violent,

and ongoing attack. Since his slumber was merely a lull in an ongoing
attack, her defensive action would be completely justified using the more
liberal definition of imminency. This assumes, of course, that the woman
possesses the requisite evidence to establish that she had been abused and
that she had reason to believe that upon awakening, her husband would
resume or begin a cycle of violence. Furthermore, with such a new
interpretation of imminency in place, BWS would be unnecessary. Rather
than requiring an expert witness to take the stand and explain the syndrome,
the jury instructions could simply include the new definition of imminency.
Although Betty Hundley's husband was not asleep when she killed
him, the circumstance would still technically be classified as one that was
nonconfrontational because there had been a lull in the violence, i.e., his
back was turned and the beating had stopped. 8 Thus, the same analysis
would apply. The few calm moments after the rape, but preceding the
killing, were merely a lull in the ongoing attack. If the United States
employed such an interpretation, the defensive conduct would be deemed
necessary.

9

178. Hundley, 693 P.2d at 476.
179. •MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1994).
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XVII. CONCLUSION
In the United States, women were historically viewed as the
equivalent of chattel whose primary role was that of a care taker. The laws
reflected this attitude. Slowly, certain laws evolved to reflect a modernized
society which acknowledged women's rights. Unfortunately, criminal law
has not mirrored this evolution. Germany has managed to craft the flexible
interpretation of imminency which accommodates the unique situation of
the battered woman. The adoption of such an interpretation seems long
overdue for the United States. With only minor alteration, or simply
enlightened interpretation, the United States law of self-defense could also
accommodate the special circumstances of the battered woman.
Fortunately, women's rights advocates are aggressively pursuing
enactment of legislation precisely aimed at eradicating violence against
women. The United States Congress recently enacted the Violence Against
Women Act'10 which addresses violence against women in various settings,
particularly in the home. It is the first United States federal law to be
exclusively devoted to the abolition and prevention of violence against
women. One can only hope that this is indicative of a new and enlightened
trend which recognizes women not as victims, but as equal beings.
This article suggests that American courts could employ defensive
necessity without having to resort to the battered woman syndrome. The
reluctance to employ such a defense, and instead, resort to invoking a
psychological syndrome, is motivated by faulty and biased perceptions of
battered women. Violence against women is a pervasive and critical
problem which requires international attention. Betty Hundley is but one
of millions who are beaten and raped every day by their mates. If she is
not legally justified in killing her tormentor, who is?

180.

42 U.S.C. § 14013 (1994).

